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Title: “Women Have Found Respect”: Gender Quotas, Symbolic Representation and Female
Empowerment in Rwanda
Author: Jennie E. Burnet, Department of Anthropology, University of Louisville
Abstract: Building on previous studies of women’s formal, descriptive, and substantive
representation in Rwanda, this article examines women’s symbolic representation, meaning the
broader social and cultural impact of the greater representation of women in the Rwandan
political system. It explores the cultural meanings of gender quotas by analyzing popular
perceptions of women, of women’s roles in politics and society more broadly, and of changing
cultural practices vis-à-vis gender. Data were gathered over twenty four months of ethnographic
research conducted between 1997 and 2009, and ongoing documentary research. The study finds
that although Rwandan women have made few legislative gains, they have reaped other benefits,
including increased respect from family and community members, enhanced capacity to speak
and be heard in public forums, greater autonomy in decision-making in the family, and increased
access to education. Yet, there have also been some unexpected negative consequences such as
increased friction with male siblings, male withdrawal from politics, increased marital discord,
and a perception that marriage as an institution has been disrupted by the so-called “upheaval” of
gender roles. Most significantly, increased formal representation of women has not led to
increased democratic legitimacy for the government.
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Title: “Women Have Found Respect”: Gender Quotas, Symbolic Representation and Female
Empowerment in Rwanda
Author: Jennie E. Burnet, Department of Anthropology, University of Louisville

Gender quota policies, aimed at increasing the proportion of women in political office,
now exist in more than 100 countries.1 While gender quota policies tend to emphasize the
number of women in government, in many countries they “have led to a shift not only in the
political agenda but also in the gender consciousness of female representatives and the political
engagement of female constituents” (Krook 2006:111). The use of gender quotas to increase
women’s representation rests on political theory about representation. Pitkin’s (1967) seminal
work on political representation conceived of representation as multi-faceted, comprised of
formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation. Using Pitkin’s theoretical model,
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005:424) tested an integrated model of women’s representation in
thirty one countries. Their results confirmed the interconnectedness of these dimensions of
representation and suggested that increased formal and descriptive representation of women
increases legislatures’ responsiveness to women’s concerns. Yet, they also found that “women’s
policy responsiveness has little or no influence on women’s perceptions of the legitimacy of the
legislature” (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:424). Since their analysis only included
representative democracies, it is unclear whether the same interconnectedness holds for nondemocratic governments who implement gender quotas.
In this article, I examine the impact of gender quotas on the symbolic representation of
women and girls in Rwandan society. Building on my previous study of women’s formal,
descriptive, and substantive representation in Rwanda (Burnet 2008a), my main purpose is to
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understand the cultural meanings of national, local, and party gender quotas in the Rwandan
political system. Rwandan women have reaped little legislative benefit from the increased
presence of women in the legislature (Burnet 2008a). However, little legislative impact does not
necessarily mean that gender quotas have had no impact at all. What does the increased presence
of women in governance symbolize for ordinary citizens? Have public attitudes towards women,
whether as political leaders or ordinary members of society, changed? Have gender quotas raised
awareness of what women can achieve? Have quotas legitimated women “as political actors,
unraveling at least to some degree previously accepted gender roles” (Franceschet, Krook, and
Piscopo, N.d.)? How have public attitudes towards women in politics and women in general
changed in response to the increased representation of women in governance structures? I
address these questions by examining women’s (and some men’s) perceptions of women as well
as women’s roles in politics and society more broadly. I also consider changing cultural practices
vis-à-vis gender. These data were gathered over twenty four months of ethnographic research
conducted between 1997 and 2009, as well as ongoing documentary research.
Rwanda is frequently cited as a success story in terms of the impact of gender quotas. In
2008, Rwanda became the first and only country in the world with a majority-female, national
legislative body. Yet, more detailed analysis of the Rwandan case reveals that increased
representation of women has not led to a greater statutory protection of women’s rights, nor has
it led to a more democratic political terrain. Nonetheless, this case study finds that gender quotas
have generated impacts far beyond the political sphere. The top-down policies that brought large
numbers of women into government improved women’s career and economic opportunities,
thereby improving social mobility among women. Because quotas apply to national, regional,
and local levels, their impact has been broad and deep. Additionally, the RPF’s women-friendly
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policies overturned the colonial and post-colonial patriarchal gender paradigm, whereby
husbands worked and made important decisions while wives managed the domestic sphere and
remained financially dependent on men. Yet, urban, elite women have reaped the greatest
benefits from these changes, thanks to increased access to salaried jobs, including lucrative
positions in the national legislature and ministries, and greater purchasing power (for items like
automobiles, clothing, and domestic servants), whereas rural peasant women in elected positions
in local government have seen their workload increase and their economic security undermined.
Another key finding of this case study is that citizens do not distinguish between the
impact of gender quotas and many other policy changes and laws that have improved the status
of women in Rwandan society more broadly. When asked about the impact of the gender quotas,
respondents did not make explicit, causal links between the increased representation of women in
all branches of government at the national, regional, and local levels, on the one hand, and new
women-friendly legislation or policies or changed relationships between citizens and the state, on
the other. Rather, they viewed the quotas as part of this broader set of reforms implemented by
the RPF-led government. Given that policy decisions and their implementation flow top-down,
and that members of parliament are not perceived as representing constituents’ interests or
concerns, it is no surprise that citizens link the gender quota policy and women in office to a
broader set of commitments to gender equality. These government policies have had a diffuse
and widespread impact on citizens’ daily lives, particularly in terms of women’s choices and
opportunities.
After a brief explanation of my research methods, I provide background information on
the Rwandan political system, Rwandan conceptions of gender, and the evolution of gender
quotas in Rwanda. Then, I present data on the positive impacts of gender quotas as perceived by
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ordinary Rwandans. In the third section, I discuss popular perceptions of the negative impacts of
gender quotas. In the concluding section, I discuss the implications of the data and the
relationships between gender, power and democratic legitimacy, as well as the implications of
the Rwandan case for political theory about gender quotas and political representation of
marginalized groups.
Methodology
This article is based on ethnographic research conducted in urban and rural Rwanda
between 1997 and 2009, including over a hundred formal interviews with the leaders and
members of women’s civil society organizations, several hundred ethnographic interviews with
ordinary citizens in rural and urban Rwanda, as well as monitoring of legal statutes and policy
changes in Rwanda and ongoing literature reviews. In depth, ethnographic research constitutes a
holistic approach, often summarized as “participant observation,” and has widespread acceptance
within anthropology. This approach consists of intensive, mixed methods research often with a
focus on qualitative data.2 Data collected as part of my ongoing ethnographic research in
Rwanda have included indirect and direct observations of behavior, and elicitation techniques,
including ethnographic interviews, unstructured and semi-structured individual interviews, semistructured group interviews, and structured interviews.3 In the highly politicized context of postgenocide Rwanda, ethnographic interviews have proven to be “the only realistic tool available
for gathering information” as Bernard and Ryan (2010:28) explain. While ethnographic
interviews appear to be informal conversation, they are instead intentional interactions on the
part of the ethnographer who elicits information on issues of interest through the use of simple
questions, such as “What do you think about X?” or by asking follow-up questions when
informants spontaneously bring up an issue of interest to the ethnographer. According to Bernard
5

and Ryan, the goal of ethnographic interviews is “to understand the cultural norms” (Bernard and
Ryan 2010:28).
To investigate the cultural implications of the gender quota policies, I conducted
individual and group interviews with male and female citizens in urban and rural Rwanda,
grassroots women’s organizations, members of government, former members of government,
and women leaders of civil society organizations on the cultural implications of the gender quota
policies during a five week field trip in 2009. This intentional sample was selected in order to
assess the broader impacts of gender quotas on Rwandan society and perceptions of women.
Except where noted, I conducted all interviews myself in either Kinyarwanda, French or English.
Interviews in Kinyarwanda were conducted with a Rwandan interpreter.4 Questions about the
impact of gender quotas were integrated into semi-structured interviews that covered several
other topics. First, a basic question on the impact of gender quotas was asked: “What changes in
Rwandan society or your daily life have resulted from the government’s gender quota policy?”
Then, several probing questions were used to elicit additional information, such as: (1)
“Anything else?” (2) “You mentioned many positive changes, have there been any negative
changes?” (3) “You mentioned several negative changes, have there been any positive changes?”
All interviewees refused to be recorded with a digital audio recorder so interview
“transcripts” were recreated based on detailed, handwritten notes taken by the author and
interpreter.5 Ethnographic interview were recorded in field notes written on a daily basis. The
interview transcripts and field notes were coded using in vivo coding for major themes that
emerged during the interviews. Additional themes were generated during the production of
interview transcripts and during reading transcripts and field notes after the fact. A subset of
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themes were then selected and developed into a code book for use in data analysis, as described
by Bernard and Ryan (2010, Chapters 3 and 4).
The 2009 data were then compared with earlier data gathered in previous field trips to
Rwanda. Throughout the 15 years I have been conducting research on Rwanda, data collected
have included interview transcripts, detailed field notes written on a daily basis, Rwandan
newspaper and magazine articles, online articles and discussions on Rwandan websites, and
ongoing monitoring of the New Times (Rwanda’s daily, independent English-language
newspaper), BBC Kinyarwanda-Kirundi news service, and Imvaho Nshya (Rwanda’s daily
government-run Kinyarwanda-language newspaper), as well as allAfrica.com which draws news
stories from sources across the continent.6
In the 2009 group interviews, most respondents were female, but some men were also
interviewed on the subject.7 Throughout this article, I indicate the sex of interviewees and
usually the region where the interview was conducted, but names and other identifying
information have been withheld per confidentiality protocols. Given the composition of my
sample, I am primarily relating the effects of women’s attitudes and of men’s attitudes as
perceived by women.
Rwandan Politics, Gender Quotas, and the Women’s Agenda
Rwanda is probably best known for the 1994 genocide in which at least 500,000
Rwandans, primarily Tutsi as well as politically-moderate Hutu, lost their lives in statesanctioned massacres.8 The genocide occurred in the midst of a civil war, which began in
October 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel movement based in Uganda,
invaded Rwanda.9 The genocide came to a halt when the RPF seized the capital, Kigali, on July 4,
1994. In mid-July 1994, the RPF named a transitional government, which it called the
7

‘Government of National Unity,’ whose composition reaffirmed the RPF’s promised
commitment to power sharing outlined in the Arusha Accords by including representatives from
political parties that had not supported the genocide. By 1995, it was clear that the power-sharing
arrangement was more window-dressing than reality as the RPF exerted greater influence than
the other parties and mandated most policies. This consensual dictatorship continued until 1998
when the government launched a transition process that it called “democratization.”
This transition began with the election of grassroots administrative leaders at the 10house, cell and sector levels through queuing behind candidates at open air community meetings.
District-level elections through secret ballot were held in 2001, and a Constitutional Commission
was appointed. In 2003, a new constitution was approved through national referendum in May
followed by presidential elections in August and parliamentary elections in September. Despite
these elections, the RPF-regime has become more authoritarian since this transition process
began (Longman 2006, 146; Reyntjens 2006). The “orchestrated nature of elections is an open
secret in Rwanda” (Burnet 2008a, 366). RPF officials have vetted candidates in elections at
every level since 1998, and in most communities, the population was informed in advance of the
“correct” candidate for whom to vote.10 Beyond influencing election outcomes, the RPF-regime
has maintained tight reins on the government and private media by silencing dissenting voices
systematically, suppressing independent civil society organizations, and destroying potential
opposition parties (Reyntjens 2010).
Rwanda ranks very low on most democracy measures.11 The 2003 Constitution created a
presidential system with a national parliament and prime minister who performs many of the
duties of a vice president. Most seats in both houses of parliament are elected through direct
elections, but eight senators are appointed by the President and another four by the Forum of
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Political Formations. The Rwandan political system is nominally multi-party, but in practice it is
a single party system with the RPF functioning as a state party. While Parliament is majority
female, most of these women are card-carrying members of the RPF or its coalition partners. In
addition, women elected to seats reserved for women were nominated, or at least vetted, by the
RPF via the Forum of Political Parties, an umbrella organization that all political parties must
join by constitutional mandate. Thus, most of these women owe allegiance to the RPF rather than
to the constituencies who elected them.
Despite its authoritarian approach to governance, the RPF has mainstreamed women from
the beginning and many of its policies have been modeled after the National Resistance
movement in Uganda (Longman 2006, 140). Some of its achievements include the creation of a
ministry of gender, the creation of women’s councils from the grassroots to the national level,
and the promotion of women’s civil society organizations (Burnet 2008a, 373-380). Numerous
pieces of legislation have extended additional rights to women, including classification of rape or
sexual torture as among the most serious crimes in the genocide statute, additional rights for
pregnant and breast-feeding women in the workplace, a law outlining children’s rights that
included all the rights outlined in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child, the
2003 Constitution which mandated women must occupy at least 30 percent of positions in
decision-making bodies, and a gender-based violence law (Burnet 2008a; Devlin & Elgie 2008,
249). Yet, as Devlin and Elgie (2008, 249) note, only one significant piece of legislation (the
gender-based violence law) was passed after the 2003 elections when legislative gender quotas
began. Many improvements in the situation of women and women’s rights in Rwanda emerged
from women’s civil society organizations and the women’s movement in Rwanda prior to the
institution of gender quotas. For example, the granting of inheritance rights to girl children
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through changes in the marriage laws in 1998 could not have been achieved without lobbying by
women civil society organizations and women in the government (Burnet 2008a).12
On the international stage, Rwanda is often perceived as a success story where the 1994
genocide gave way to a subsequent renaissance in Rwandan society under the guidance of the
RPF’s Paul Kagame, initially as Vice President and later as President. The notable advances of
women have contributed to this perception (Burnet 2008a, 370-371; Powley 2003, 2005, 2008a,
2008b). The 2001 district-level elections, which included reserved seats (approximately 30
percent) for women at the cell, sector, and district levels of government, led to a dramatic
increase in female representation in local government. Thus, the story of women’s representation
in Rwanda extends far beyond the national government, penetrating all the way down to the
grassroots. Given that the vast majority of citizens only rarely (or even never) come into contact
with senators or deputies but come into monthly contact with local officials at mandatory
community meetings and communal labor projects (umuganda), it is not surprising that the
majority of ordinary Rwandans interviewed for this research spoke most often about women in
the local government and community rather than the national legislature.
Despite these remarkable gains by women, several analysts have concluded that the
RPF’s women-friendly policies have been manipulated as a tool to help maintain their hold on
power and to maintain a positive reception from the international community (Burnet 2008a;
Longman 2006; Reyntjens 2010). Yet, whether or not the RPF served its own ends through the
increased protection of women’s rights and the greater representation of women in government,
these policies could “lead to transformations in political identities, subjectivities, and agencies”
and might “pave the way for effective engagement in democratic governance should it emerge”
(Burnet 2008a, 386). In this article I attempt to assess these transformations and understand
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them as resulting from the increased symbolic representation of women in the Rwandan public
sphere.
Gender roles have changed dramatically since the 1994 genocide. The genocide, civil war
(1990-1994), and their aftermaths resulted in rapid change within society, especially in terms of
gender roles. The civil war and genocide produced over two million refugees along with
hundreds of thousands more internally displaced persons. The economic and physical
infrastructure had been destroyed at every level. Following the genocide, many Rwandan women
found themselves as heads of household, whether because their husbands were dead, in exile, in
prison, or in military service with the RPF. Survivors, particularly women, found that so-called
“traditional” ways of life and modes of being were no longer possible.
According to Rwandan custom, women relied on men for access to the means of
livelihood (Burnet and RISD 2003, 187; Human Rights Watch 1996, 19). After the genocide,
women took on new roles in the domestic and public spheres that Rwandan society had
previously not ascribed to them. These roles included everyday tasks customarily taboo for
women, like putting roofs on houses, constructing enclosures around houses, or milking cows,
and, additional roles in society, such as head of household or government administrator (Burnet
2008a, 384). Many Rwandan women took on primary economic responsibility for their
households because their husbands were either absent or unable to do it. Prior to the genocide,
Rwandan law forbade Rwandan women from engaging in commercial activities, entering into
contract, or seeking paid employment without authorization from their husbands (Human Rights
Watch 1996, 22). In practice, many husbands (and even most husbands in the cities) allowed
and even encouraged their wives to work, but the husbands often controlled the women’s salaries
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or profits from commercial endeavors. Women’s businesses were vulnerable, in practice and by
law, to plunder by their husbands or to complete takeover (Jefremovas 2002, 97-108).
With the disruption in gender relations, some women found the freedom to pursue careers
or commercial activities. Yet, this “opportunity” to challenge customary notions of womanhood
and women’s roles in the family and community should not be portrayed too rosily, as some
journalists and feminist policy analysts have tended to do. For peasant women in rural areas, the
absence of husbands increased the burden of crushing poverty and social isolation. Farming
without their husbands’ labor resulted in a heavier workload and lower yields, as well as reduced
social status in the community (Burnet 2008a, 385). The lack of income from husbands’ labor
in the cash economy left widows and prisoners’ families without the money necessary to pay for
health care or school fees. For middle class and elite women, their new found “freedom” was
bittersweet. Even the most successful business women lamented the heavy burden of bearing
sole financial responsibility for themselves and their children—not to mention the social,
emotional, and psychological consequences of widowhood or single motherhood.13 Many
researchers have understood this gender revolution as an example of war disrupting normal
social relations, however, others (Burnet 2008a; Longman 2006; Newbury and Baldwin 2000;
Newbury and Baldwin 2001a; Newbury and Baldwin 2001b) have demonstrated that the war and
genocide accelerated transformations that were already underway in Rwandan society.
Since 1999, the Government of Rwanda has simultaneously pursued three types of
quotas: reserved seats, party quotas, and legislative quotas. The first reserved seats were created
through administrative decisions about the 2001 local level elections where female candidates
stood for seats reserved for women at the cell, sector, and district levels. The 2003 Constitution
created reserved seats for women in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of parliament.
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Party quotas have been pursued since at least 1994 with the creation of the transitional
government. Political parties sought to nominate female candidates for cabinet posts or to
include women on party lists for government appointments. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) ,
the de facto state party, has mainstreamed women in its own infrastructure since its origins as a
rebel army, with women occupying important posts in the party, and in the Rwandan government
after they came to power in 1994 (Burnet 2008a, 363). Many of the RPF policies and approaches
have been modeled after those of the Museveni and the National Resistance Movement in
Uganda (Burnet 2008a, 367). Powley (2005, 159) attributed the RPF’s approach to gender as
emerging out of Tutsi exiles’ experiences of discrimination.14 According to statements from RPF
leaders, such as Rose Kabuye and John Mutamba, the RPF embraced notions of gender equality
in the hopes of improving society. Since at least 1998, other political parties have actively
recruited female candidates, promoted women to cabinet level appointments, included them on
party lists, and put them forward as candidates in general elections for non-reserved seats.15 As a
result of these policies, Rwanda elected the first female majority national legislative chamber in
2008 when women secured 56.25% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, far surpassing the
30 percent reserved seats for women.16 As Meier (N.d.) found in the Belgium, the rising number
of women in Rwandan politics cannot be attributed to gender quotas alone; in Rwanda many
women won seats not reserved by the quota system. The 2003 constitution provided legislative
quotas guaranteeing that women should comprise at least 30% of all positions in decisionmaking bodies and not only the national legislature (see article 9, number 3).
Since gaining a female majority in parliament, the Forum of Women Parliamentarians
(FWP), a caucus for female members of parliament, has struggled to define a legislative agenda
for women. In 2004, the FWP did not take specific policy stances on the 2004 Land Law. Instead,
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they, along with the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development, stated that land was an
issue for all Rwandans and not just for women despite the fact that a policy study by LandNet
found that rural women viewed land rights as central to their livelihood and well-being (Burnet
and RISD 2003). Before gaining this majority, the FWP led several policy initiatives to enhance
women’s rights, including the 1998 inheritance law, which gave women and girls equal rights to
inheritance and established the capacity for women to keep their property separate in marriage,
and the inclusion of gender quotas in the 2003 constitution. In 2006, the FWP found a unifying
women’s issue, gender-based violence (GBV), and drafted a bill. A UNIFEM press release
erroneously stated that the parliament passed the bill in 2006 (Zirimwabagabo, 1996), but the law
languished in committee for nearly two years.17 The GBV bill finally became law in 2008 and
added important protections to women’s rights and made domestic violence illegal under
Rwandan law (Republic of Rwanda, 2009a). While the GBV bill was an important victory, less
than a year later the majority female parliament approved a new labor code that reduced
maternity leave from eight to two weeks of paid leave and increased the work week from five to
six days and from forty to forty-five hours (Republic of Rwanda, 2009b). As discussed later in
this article, ordinary Rwandans often pointed to this labor legislation as an example of how
female parliamentarians put their individual interests (i.e., staying in their positions) ahead those
of average Rwandan women’s interests. Urban elites frequently cited the new labor law as an
example of “politics as usual” meaning the legislature rubber-stamped whatever laws the
executive branch or RPF inner circle mandated.
Several scholars have argued that women’s increased presence in government sends
important signals to female citizens that lead them to become more politically involved or feel
more politically efficacious (Atkeson 2003; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; High-Pippert and Comer
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1998). Yet others have found that the election of women appears to have only weak effects on
trends in women’s political engagement (Karp and Banducci 2008). In Rwanda, the impact of
gender quotas on women’s political engagement, defined as participation in elections, is difficult
to assess because voting is required in practice although not by law. Participation in elections is
recorded on citizens’ voter registration cards and since 2009 on the electronic chip embedded in
the new national identity cards. Local officials question citizens who do not vote and may assess
fines or withhold government services, such as issuing birth certificates or other documents.
Measuring the impact of quotas on female citizens’ political involvement or feelings of
political efficacy is equally difficult because the country is not democratic, and citizens (and
even legislators) have little capacity to influence policy. Although the political system is
representative in name, in that parliamentarians are said to “represent” specific geographic
regions, in practice this representation is fictitious because most members of parliament do not
reside, and in some cases may never have resided, in the communities they were elected to
represent. Because elections are staged events with predetermined outcomes, members of
parliament have little or no incentive to represent their constituents’ interests. In addition, most
legislation originates in the executive branch so members of parliament rarely generate or even
shape legislation. In fact, they are strongly incentivized to follow the policies dictated by the
executive so that they remain in good stead with the RPF and retain their seats in parliament,
which come with generous salaries, stipends, great social prestige, and many other benefits.
What is measurable in the Rwandan case is how the dramatic increase of women in the
public sphere raised “awareness of what women can achieve and legitimate[d] women as
political actors, unraveling at least to some degree previously accepted gender roles” as
Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo (N.d.) describe symbolic representation. In conversations with
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a wide variety of Rwandans, in group interviews with grassroots women’s organizations, and in
individual interviews with leaders of women’s civil society organizations conducted in May and
June 2009, most respondents agreed that gender quotas and the increased representation of
women in the political system have encouraged women to take leading roles in others areas of
Rwandan society.
Winning the Race: Positive Perceptions of Gender Quotas and their Impact
In 2009 when asked whether broader cultural changes had been provoked by gender
quotas, women responded with a decisive yes. Respondents consistently reported that women felt
freer to speak out in public, had increased access to education, and had become “entrepreneurs”
in every arena, including politics. Although interviewees gave these responses to questions about
gender quotas, my ethnographic data going back to 1997 make it clear that several other factors
have also impacted Rwandan women’s political subjectivity (Burnet 2005, N.d.). These factors
include the large number of female-headed households after the genocide, the experiences of
women in refugee camps between 1994 and 1996 or 1997, the roles of women’s organizations
and local associations before and after the genocide, the roles played by international
organizations encouraging women’s engagement with community matters, the 1998 elections of
grassroots women’s structures, and the cell, sector and district level elections in 2001.
Women as Entrepreneurs in Every Arena. The majority female legislature and inclusion
of many more women in all levels of the government have had a dramatic impact on Rwandan
society more generally. In response to a question about the impact of gender quotas in the
Rwandan political system, one female interviewee said,
You see that women have become true entrepreneurs in every arena. Most of the
cars on the road today in Kigali are driven proudly by women. They [women]
16

have raced ahead and seized every opportunity. They have gone back to school to
get their degrees. They have started businesses. They have joined the Party
[referring to the RPF] and gotten government posts.18
Women have surged ahead in all domains in the wake of the 2003 Constitution which created
legislative gender quotas.
While the majority female legislature has been an important symbolic victory for
Rwandan women, of greater impact has been women’s increased engagement in local level
governance structures. Many women serve as local level (village, cell, sector, or district) elected
officials in posts not reserved for women. Their acceptance by local communities represents a
sea change in public attitudes towards women. Increased participation of women at the local
level has helped to legitimate women as political agents in the popular imagination of rural
people. When asked whether women were capable of leading and wielding power as well as men,
one woman from North province responded, “better than the men even. A woman knows what
she should do and when she should do it,” implying that men can easily be distracted from their
mission by other things such as beer or women.
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004, 1428) found that female citizens in India were twice as
likely to communicate with local elected officials if there was a female elected official occupying
a seat reserved for women through gender quotas. My findings in Rwanda suggest a similar
effect. Several women interviewed in 2009 noted that the gender quota policies had given
women an advantage over men in regards to problem-solving. As one woman stated in a group
interview with a women’s cooperative in a rural community in North province, “A woman can
easily approach her female friend who is an authority. This authority understands her well and
can help her with her problems. That’s where the men have found problems.”19 Thus, female
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community members hope a female local authority can understand things from their perspective
and give assistance in their capacity as government officials. Yet, this respondent also noted that
men felt that they have lost out because they no longer have the advantage of approaching local
authorities informally at a local bar over a beer to expose their problems and seek a solution.
Furthermore, as I discuss in detail below, not all interviewees indicated that female local
authorities were any different than the men in this or other regards.
Speaking Out in Public. In a 2009 group interview, one respondent said, “women dare to
speak up at public meetings…There is a Kinyarwanda proverb that says, ‘Nta nkokokazi ibika
hari isake— Hens do not crow where there is a rooster’.”20 Over the past fifteen years, I have
often heard this proverb used to express the notion that women should be silent in public and
allow men to speak on behalf of the entire community. According to custom, husbands (or
fathers or brothers) represented a household in meetings, and they voiced any concerns of the
household on behalf of all household members, including their wives (or daughters or sisters).
Yet, as will be discussed in more detail below, a wife could represent the household in meetings
if her husband was absent. Nonetheless, before the implementation of quotas in the 2003
constitution, women were unlikely to speak up at public meetings and were easily silenced by
men if they did not agree with the women’s opinions.
The willingness of women to speak in public settings has grown dramatically since 2003.
When I interviewed women members of a church-based organization in a rural community in
southern Rwanda in 2001, they expressed reluctance to speak up at public meetings although
they were active participants in the life of their own organization. When I returned in 2007 and
again in 2009, the same women proudly recounted their vocal participation in local government
and community meetings. Several of the association members served as inyangamugayo (judges)
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in the cell and sector level Gacaca courts that had been responsible for adjudicating cases of
genocide between 2003 and 2007.21 In addition, the association members had conducted their
own investigations, located witnesses, and advocated for the release of people falsely accused of
genocide during the Gacaca process. All of these activities were somewhat risky given lingering
tensions over the genocide. The women attributed their willingness to speak out to the broader
impact of the national gender quota policy on men and women’s attitudes towards female
citizens’ competency. The large number of women in local government coupled with the clear
endorsement of women as political authorities by President Kagame, the RPF, and central
government sent a clear message to rural citizens that women must be accepted as legitimate
political agents or local government authorities.
Greater Access to Education. Many interviewees in 2009 cited girls’ increased access to
education as a benefit of the increased representation of women in governance. National
campaigns to promote universal education as well as the new found career opportunities for
educated women convinced many rural families that educating female children was a worthwhile
investment. A female interviewee noted that “girls attend school in large numbers in Rwanda
today, not like in the past when they were kept at home to cook, clean, take care of younger
children, and work in the fields.”22 World Bank Development Indicators support the perception
that more girl children attend school now than in the past and that girl children attend school in
greater numbers than boy children.23 Although the campaign for universal education cannot be
directly tied to the increased representation of women in government or to gender quotas, in the
minds of average citizens, particularly rural farmers, increased education of girl children is
connected to gender quotas because these initiatives are perceived as being part of the
government policy initiative to improve the status of women.
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Joint decision-making over domestic resources. Rwandan women in colonial and
postcolonial times lived beneath a legal regime that subordinated them to men by impeding
women’s economic autonomy. Many of the women-friendly policies implemented by the RPFled government since 1994 have improved women’s economic autonomy by restoring individual
economic rights to married women. The transformation in women’s economic independence
accelerated rapidly starting in 1998 well before the creation of legislative gender quotas. In
interviews and focus groups conducted in 2009, the most frequently mentioned impact of
legislative gender quotas in Rwanda was on the joint decision-making over domestic resources in
Rwanda and the increased autonomy of women as economic subjects.
Woman, North province: Before, the husband made decisions on his own. For
example, a husband wanted to buy a field without his wife knowing it. He sold
livestock as he wished without consulting his wife. But, today, the men must try,
and we discuss things together to see the advantages and disadvantages. And, in
making decisions about having children, we make them together. Except for some
men who do not understand, this [policy] helps people to make decisions together.
Before the state made this law, the men did as they wished. They brought many
wives [married more than one woman at a time]. But now, that is no longer the
case.24
Woman, South province: There are men who sit down with their families and they
make their decisions together. A daughter who cultivated a field of cassava with
her mother and they made 60,000 RwF profit. When they showed the money to
the father, they decided to buy a cow. The cow is there, and the husband is very
happy, and he encourages his wife and daughter.25
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Female interviewees, even those who classified their marriages as “good” before the 1994
genocide and civil war, noted a change in the ways that spouses made decisions about family
resources. They said that their husbands had begun to recognize that wives sometimes had good
ideas and that women were less likely to waste their money on alcohol or gambling.
Another key change that interviewees noted in 2009 was women’s autonomy as
economic agents to go out and become entrepreneurs. One woman explained how this change
enhanced family life and marriage, “A wife can leave the house to go find money like men. In
this way, there aren’t any conflicts. Husband and wife, together, find a way to move the family
forward [develop the family].”26 Increased economic autonomy was not a benefit cited by all
women. For instance, widows and other female heads of household emphasized how difficult it
was to bear sole responsibility for the financial well being of the family and the challenges of
balancing work (whether managing a farm, a business, or a professional job) and domestic
responsibilities.
“Women have found respect.” Perhaps the most significant evidence of the impact of
gender quotas on the symbolic representation of women in Rwandan governance was the
repeated mention that the inclusion of women in governance helped women “find respect”
(babona agaciro). The word I have translated as respect, agaciro, can also mean utility, value,
importance, or (good) reputation (Jacob 1984, 188).
In interviews and focus groups conducted in 2009, the term agaciro frequently came up
when women were commenting on the impact of quotas on relationships between men and
women in the community or in the home. In response to a follow up question about the reduction
in domestic violence in the region, one woman explained that husbands no longer hit their wives
“because of awareness raising campaigns and because men have realized the dignity of women
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(agaciro k’umugore).”27 This woman implicitly linked quotas to the government’s awareness
campaigns against domestic violence and explicitly linked the campaigns to men’s changed
attitudes. Another woman attributed the change in men’s behavior to women gaining respect,
“women have found respect (babonye agaciro), the men no longer have many wives, almost not
at all now.”28 Respondents in this focus group went on to explain the ways women supported
each other to oppose a husband who took a second wife and force him to leave her. One woman
explained women’s liberation as a fait accompli that a few stubborn men had yet to accept,
“there are still those men who do not want to accept the authority of women, who don’t know
that women have found respect (yahawe agaciro).”29
Almost universally, urban and rural women voiced pride about the change in the status of
women in Rwandan society. One rural woman marveled, “even the population obeys these
female authorities. It’s a step forward for us [women].”30 Yet, class distinctions emerged in the
responses. Urban women and rural elite women tended to focus on the spreading of so-called
“modern” ideas about the equality of the sexes to less educated Rwandans. Peasant women, on
the other hand, tended to talk more about the recognition of women’s innate dignity by both men
and women, but by men especially. These class distinctions are important since urban and rural
elite women have benefitted from gender quotas in material ways more than peasant women. As
I discuss later, peasant women have found their unpaid service in local governance structures to
be an added burden on their already heavy load. By contrast, urban and rural elite women who
worked for a salary, ran a business, or supported a husband’s career used their unpaid
government service as a means to accrue social capital.
In sum, when responding to questions about the broader impacts of the gender quota
policy on Rwandan society, respondents did not explicitly cite women’s increased representation
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as the impetus for change in gender roles. Rather, they linked the gender quota policies to a
broader set of equality reforms implemented by the RPF-led government. These reforms, as a
whole, have changed perceptions about, and the activities involved in, women’s roles. Given that
policy implementation is top-down, and given that members of parliament were not perceived as
representing constituents, it is no surprise that citizens linked gender quotas to broad government
initiatives that increased women’s public presence.
Who are the losers? The Downsides of Greater Equality
While most interviewees mentioned positive changes in Rwandan society resulting from
quotas and the empowerment of women more generally, several also mentioned unexpected
downsides. After all, if women are perceived as winning greater opportunities and autonomy,
then logically another group must be perceived as losing them. While I never asked a direct
question about men’s perceptions of these changes (to avoid generating biased responses),
several respondents spontaneously stated that men, or at least some men, felt as if they had lost
out because of the advancement of women. Three key themes emerged in the interviews:
brother’s anger over the extension of inheritance rights to women, men’s withdrawal from
politics, and increased marital discord.
Angry Brothers. When asked about social changes related to the gender quotas, many
female respondents noted that the 1998 inheritance law had increased friction between women
and their brothers. Again, respondents perceived quotas as one component of a set of policies
that have extended and protected women’s rights to and increased opportunities and equality for
women.
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Woman, North Province: Our brothers have never been happy because they are
obliged to divide the property of our parents with us. It’s a total negative for the
men.31
Woman, North Province: Allowing women to inherit is good, but we now have
conflicts with our brothers. They [an anonymous “they”, meaning “the
government”] say that we should inherit property from both our in-laws and our
own lineage as well. They [our brothers] have found that they are the losers.32
Given that it is fathers and brothers who traditionally intervened when women found themselves
in difficult or violent marriages and who offered land (and thus, livelihood) in the event of a
failed marriage or early widowhood, increased friction with their male siblings puts women,
especially peasant women, in a more fragile position socially.
Male Withdrawal from Politics. Before the 1994 genocide, politics, whether at the
national, regional or local level, were largely monopolized by men. Although a few prominent
women stood out, including Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the Prime Minister in April 1994 and one
of the first politicians killed in the genocide, men dominated the political arena. With the rise of
women in Rwandan politics since the late 1990s, many men have turned away from politics as a
career because “women are the winners.”33 Given that the outcomes of most elections in Rwanda
are predetermined, some men present their candidacy but they know in advance that the position
will go to a woman.
Furthermore, quotas have influenced civil society organizations to favor female
candidates over males with similar qualifications. This corrective to past gender biases has
catapulted women ahead but made some men feel left out. As a result of this perceived exclusion
from government and civil society organizations (the primary employers in the Rwandan
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economy), many men preferred to focus their energies on private business endeavors. Other men
faced long-term unemployment leading to crises of self-identity.
Related to this withdrawal from politics was a general “psychological complex” among
men that it was “not even worth it to try” because the “good positions” always went to women.34
As one elite woman from Kigali noted, “it’s as if men have a complex nowadays.”35 She went on
to explain that more women than men returned to school to seek degrees necessary for the
constantly rising employment standards and that it seemed as if some Rwandan men “do not
even try.”
Marital Discord. Rural and urban respondents cited increased marital discord as a
consequence of the quotas and improved status of women. Rural respondents attributed the
increased discord to men’s ignorance about women’s dignity and rights whereas urban
respondents attributed it to women “behaving like men,” meaning that women’s greater
economic autonomy had led them to enjoy individual freedoms, such as socializing after work,
that had previously been reserved for men.
Many women interviewed, particularly married women, indicated that many husbands
were frustrated about their wives’ participation in governance.
Author: How have people here received these changes?
Woman: Positive for the women, negative for the men. Men have never been able
to understand sudden changes. They are not at all happy that women are
progressing. Urugo ruvuze umugore ruvuga umuhoro— At home when the wife
speaks, out comes the knife.36
Here, the respondent focused on the transformation in women’s agency and willingness to speak
out by drawing on a Rwandan proverb. This proverb means that a vocal wife in the home means
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that there is little peace or harmony in the family. Rwandan custom calls ideologically for a
wife’s submission to her husband and his decisions. Yet, most wives who characterized their
marriages as “good” stated that husbands consult with wives when making important decisions.
Nonetheless, when husband and wife do not agree, the husband’s decision prevails. One
consequence of women’s empowerment was that some wives were less willing to silence
themselves when they thought their husbands were making unwise decisions. While I cannot use
the data I have gathered to estimate how widespread this phenomenon was, the issue was
frequently mentioned as a contributing factor to marital discord. Of greater consequence to
marital discord, however, were the competing responsibilities to household and community that
women in elected positions must negotiated.
Many rural women interviewed in 2009, whether they thought gender roles in Rwanda
had changed a lot or “not at all” as a result of quotas, said that the gender revolution in Rwanda
had increased domestic conflict for some families. Two primary reasons for increased conflict
were cited: (1) husbands who had not come to recognize the “dignity of women,” and (2)
husbands who were frustrated by the lack of benefits to the domestic unit from wives’ service as
local officials.
For those [men] who do not understand [the gender equality laws], there are
always conflicts in the family, always fights, because the men say, “When has
there ever been a wife who makes decisions for the household?” If these conflicts
persist, then there is a divorce. … It does not happen all that often but even so this
type of story is not unheard of.37
Rural married women elected to village, cell, sector or district level administrative positions
often found themselves at a loss to explain to their husbands “what good” was coming of their
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work as a government official. Local level officials did not receive a salaries or stipends, and
they spent a great deal of time exercising their duties as well as participating in meetings or
trainings. As one woman from North Province stated,
We never thought that things would be like this. A wife leaves her family for
trainings, for communal labor, for meetings, and then a week has gone by. No
time to work at home nor to go to the fields. The husband who is there thinks you
are going to come with something for the family [i.e., money or other tangible
benefit]. You see, there is nothing but trouble and conflicts in the family. When
you think about leaving this position, something that is not at all easy to do, you
are accused of having the [genocidal] ideology.38 We have found that it’s not
anything more than exploitation, creating poverty in our families … we are going
to die.39
Many wives noted that their husbands were angry or frustrated that wives were absent from the
home and the fields with “nothing to show for it.” In the past, men who served in local level
positions reaped many social benefits such as increased prestige in the community as well as
increased networking opportunities and small “gifts” (in the form of beer, crops, or money) given
by citizens in gratitude for duties rendered by a local official. Women local officials were not
gaining these benefits due to perceived gender differences as well as vigorous anti-corruption
campaigns by the Rwandan government.
Beyond lamenting the lack of tangible benefits, men made their wives’ workload heavier
by not assisting their wives with their work in the fields, at home, or in their role as local
officials. Most rural women cannot afford to hire workers to assist with the numerous duties that
fall on a wife’s shoulders: cooking, cleaning, caring for children, and fetching water at home,
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and planting, weeding, and harvesting in the fields. Since local-level elected officials were not
compensated through salaries or stipends, rural women were left to their own devices to manage
these competing responsibilities. While female local officials would have been able to justify
their absence to their husbands if they were “bringing something home,” the women arrived
“empty-handed.” Their husbands became angry because they believed that their wives were
shirking their duties in the home.
Interviewees and focus group participants in urban areas also brought up increased
marital discord as an unexpected outcome of quotas and other equality initiatives. Urban
respondents attributed increased marital discord to women “behaving like men,” referring to both
positive and negative aspects of women’s changed behavior. On the positive side, respondents
cited things like increased assertiveness in decision-making about the family and family
resources as well as increased educational attainment among women that improved their ability
to find lucrative employment. On the negative side, respondents cited several unexpected
consequences of women’s independent work and social lives as well as their increased economic
autonomy and legal protection. Because more wives had their own careers that provided
sufficient economic means to lead an independent life, women were less likely to be “stuck” in
unsatisfactory marriages as they had been in the past. Furthermore, the strengthened legal
protections of women’s rights made seeking divorce less risky for urban women. The downside
of this increased autonomy, according to respondents, was rising divorce rates.
Many respondents explained that the “promotion of women,” referring not only to quotas
but the entire set of government initiatives to increase women’s equality, had resulted in women
spending more time outside the home. More women worked outside the home and took night
courses at the many new universities. Respondents concluded that because women spent more
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time outside the home, they had more contact with men other than their husbands. As a result,
some women had begun to “behave like men” by taking lovers outside of marriage. Whereas in
the past, many wives tolerated similar dalliances by their husbands given the economic risks
involved in divorce, men were less constrained. Thus, according to the perceptions of many
urban elites, gender quotas and policies promoting women’s equality destabilized the institution
of marriage.
Nothing has changed: Gender, Power and Democratic Legitimacy
A key measure of the impact of gender quotas on the symbolic representation of women
is whether the way “citizens feel about government generally” has changed and whether the
increased presence of women in governance has led “them to judge democratic institutions as
more just and legitimate” (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, N.d.). Baldez (2006, 104) states that
gender quotas “can revitalize public faith in the political system” as they did in Latin America in
the past 15 years. In Rwanda, however, the gender quotas have had little effect on popular
perceptions of the government’s legitimacy. Although most respondents cited numerous social or
cultural changes resulting from the gender quota policies, several respondents stated explicitly
that “nothing has changed” in terms of gender roles, political power, or the democratic
legitimacy of the state in Rwanda.
Several rural women with low levels of formal education but high levels of engagement
in community based organizations insisted that little had changed in terms of gender roles in
Rwandan society, mostly because women heads of household have always made decisions. As a
woman from a rural community in South Province explained, “Nothing has changed. A woman
who is alone usually makes decisions by herself. She is used to doing everything for herself.
Who is she going to ask for advice? We haven’t noticed a change because a woman who is by
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herself doesn’t have a rival.” In other words, widows and female heads-of-household have
always exercised power in the family and in the community as heads of household and as
symbolic “men.”
Another woman from a town in North province said that quotas “have changed nothing
really. Except to make things worse.” She went on to characterize the inclusion of women in
local governance structures as a form of exploitation that increased the work overload of rural
women in the service of maintaining the ruling RPF’s hold on power, an issue I explore more in
depth below. A female CSO leader and RPF party member likewise found that rural women have
found their increased role in local governance to be an added burden.
Many international organizations link women and better governance, a link often
reiterated by Rwandan officials. However, the view from below is quite different. Peasants
generally view female officials as “no better than men,” in that female representatives face the
same pressures to comply with directives from above and the same human frailties and
temptations to corruption. For instance, when asked whether female local officials required
bribes one woman replied, “everyone must have that.” She then illustrated her point with the
following story:
One thing that happened to me, my husband was going to his parents place to
divide the fields among the brothers. I went in his place because he wasn’t
available. A mediator (umunzi), a woman, asked me directly for money by saying,
“Ma’am if you aren’t able to give us money, your husband won’t have a single
field here.” I was obliged to give the money; I didn’t have any other choice.40
Several other male and female respondents confirmed that female local officials were just as
corrupt as male. Moreover, the increased presence of women has not led Rwandan citizens to
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perceive the government as a more democratic institution. Also, when asked whether they found
it easier to talk to a female rather than a male local official, most women stated that it was “no
different.” These results coincide with those of Zetterberg (N.d.), who found that the
“undemocratic legacy of Mexican politics” led citizens to mistrust the “old (male) elite” and the
new (female) representatives. In Rwanda, women parliamentarians were not viewed as
representing either women’s interests or the interests of the communities they were formally
elected to represent.
As Baldez (2006, 105) found for many Latin American countries where candidate
nomination is a highly centralized process, gender quotas in Rwanda have reinforced the status
quo. The result of Rwanda’s gender quota policies in the eyes of many Rwandans, especially
well-educated elites in Kigali, is that it has solidified the RPF ruling party’s hold on power. In
the words of a former (male) Senator and member of an opposition political party, the only thing
gender quotas have done is “to ensure RPF dominance.” Because positions in the legislature and
the ministries are well paid and come with many benefits, women who have benefited from
quotas and occupy these positions owe their loyalties to the RPF, which echoes the importance of
patronage politics found in Morocco by Sater (N.d.) and in Uganda by O’Brien (N.d.). In
Rwanda, no matter which party they are affiliated with, women parliamentarians toe the line in
order to remain where they are. They rarely mobilize around “women’s issues” and in some
cases have voted for legislation that reduced legal protection of women or eliminated women
friendly policies.
Conclusion
When measuring the impact of gender quotas on the symbolic representation of women,
it is important to ask whether quotas have altered “gendered ideas about the public sphere, which
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have traditionally associated men with politics and women with the realm of home and the
family” (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, N.d.). In Rwanda, gender quotas have transformed
gendered ideas about the public sphere. Legislative gender quotas and policies promoting
women’s rights have promoted women in public life. In urban and rural political spaces, women
have taken visible roles in local government, business, and civil society. Yet, these changes did
not emerge solely from the legislative gender quotas instituted in 2003. Rather, their origins date
to the emergence of women’s civil society organizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s
(Burnet 2008a; Newbury and Baldwin 2000; Newbury and Baldwin 2001a; Newbury and
Baldwin 2001b). Nonetheless, gender quotas adopted by political parties in the 1990s and the
legislative quotas in 2003 accelerated these pre-existing processes of change.
Because the Rwanda is so frequently cited as a gender quota success story, it is vital to
assess broader transformations in Rwandan society accurately. While the Rwandan parliament
was the first and only in the world to be majority female, the increased representation of women
brought little change to the legislative process. Most legislation originates in the executive
branch, and the majority women parliament has created little legislation improving the status or
rights of women. Furthermore, increased female representation has not ushered in a more
democratic political era; the executive branch still maintains tight control over civil society
organizations, the media, and elections. As Zetterberg (N.d.) shows in Mexico, gender quotas are
embedded in the broader political context, and thus have little effect on women’s political
engagement or on the perceived legitimacy of democratic institutions among the electorate.
The Rwandan case does illustrate, however, that gender quotas can have impacts beyond
the political sphere. The RPF’s top-down policies have improved women’s economic and
professional opportunities and increased their social mobility. Since gender quotas apply to all

32

levels of government from the parliament all the way down to the “village” (umudugudu), the
smallest administrative unit, their impact has been broad and deep. Gender quotas have reversed
the colonial and post-colonial gender paradigm where men worked in the public sphere while
women managed the domestic sphere and remained financially dependent on men. This symbolic
reversal has benefitted urban women more than rural women because urban women have found
increased access to salaried positions and greater purchasing power while rural women in local
government positions have faced increased workloads without remuneration.
Another important finding of this case is that citizens do not distinguish between the
impact of legislative gender quotas and the many other policy changes that improve the status of
women and girls (such as mandatory primary school education). Perhaps, citizens’ frequent
contact with local level government officials and the distance of parliamentarians leads them to
focus on changes in their everyday lives. The prevalence of generalized responses to specific
questions about women and politics in my data, however, signals an important reality of
Rwandan life: criticism of the government, the RPF, or President Kagame and of policy or
legislation is risky. By citing broader benefits of a set of policies and laws that improved the
status of women in Rwandan society, respondents avoided making specific, and possibly critical,
statements about those in power. In rare instances, respondents who trusted me and other
listeners made frank (and critical) statements about some of the negative consequences of the
gender quotes, their impact on symbolic representation of women, and the tightly controlled
nature of politics.
Several lessons can be drawn from this case study. First, having more women in
government does not necessarily lead to greater democracy or a more democratic government.
Second, even when implemented as top-down policies put in place by an authoritarian regime,
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gender quotas and equality policies more broadly can lead to significant cultural changes in
attitudes towards and perceptions of women and their competence. Third, more women in
government can lead to increased political, social and economic agency among all female
citizens and not only those women in government. Finally, women’s increased autonomy can
have unintended negative consequences such as marital discord, rising divorce rates, and an
increased workload on women who are already overburdened.
The Rwandan case suggests that Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler’s (2005) finding that
increased formal and descriptive representation of women increases legislature’s responsiveness
to women’s concerns does not hold true for (non-democratic) authoritarian states. Given that
women legislators in Rwanda are more beholden to the RPF political party than to the
constituents who, in theory if not in practice, elected them, it is not surprising that these women
legislators supported legislative proposals (such as the labor law) emerging from and supported
by the executive branch. Nonetheless, if Pearson’s (2003) assessment of Rwandan
parliamentarians’ lack of experience drafting legislation is accurate, then hypothetically we may
see greater legislative initiative on the part of the FWP and parliamentarians in the future.
Current signs, however, point to the continuation of an authoritarian style of governance in
Rwanda (Reyntjens 2010).
The 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections were characterized by severe
repression of independent media critical of the RPF or President Kagame and by the suppression
of the few genuine opposition parties that tried to establish themselves (Reyntjens 2010, 12). In
addition, average Rwandans lived in great fear during the months leading up to the elections.
This fear was best summed up by a genocide survivor who responded “Pray for us,” to an email
where I asked about the social atmosphere a month before the elections. Shortly, after President
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Kagame’s landslide victory of President Kagame for his second, and final term under the current
constitution, a minister in the new cabinet suggested a change in the constitution to allow
President Kagame to run for a third term.
This case also confirms that Pitkin’s multi-faceted model of political representation is
helpful in understanding representation in non-democratic states. Transformations in formal and
descriptive representation can lead to changes in symbolic representation even if substantive
representation does not improve. As some interviewees noted, “nothing has changed” in terms of
substantive representation because increased formal representation has not transformed the
governance style. Despite Devlin and Eglie’s (2008, 251) finding that Rwandan women
legislators felt confident that a “gender agenda” was guaranteed by their presence, ordinary
citizens perceived legislators as putting their own individual interests ahead of the broader
populations’. Although Pitkin’s model is relevant and helpful, the Rwandan case also suggests
that the experience of women’s representation is not universal as Devlin and Eglie (2008, 250)
conclude, but rather it is, at least in part, context specific. Local configurations of state, political,
and economic power matter as they influence the experience and outcomes of political
representation.
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